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Abstract
This paper presents a method for analyzing the survivability of distributed network systems
and an example of its application. Survivability is the capability of a system to fulfill its mis-
sion, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. Survivability re-
quires capabilities for intrusion resistance, recognition, and recovery. The Survivable Net-
work Analysis (SNA) method builds on the Information Security Evaluation previously
developed by permitting assessment of survivability strategies at the architecture level. Steps
in the SNA method include system mission and architecture definition, essential capability
definition, compromisable capability definition, and survivability analysis of architectural
softspots that are both essential and compromisable. Intrusion scenarios play a key role in the
method. SNA results are summarized in a Survivability Map which links recommended sur-
vivability strategies for resistance, recognition, and recovery to the system architecture and
requirements. This case study summarizes the application and results of applying the SNA
method to a subsystem of a large-scale, distributed healthcare system. The study recom-
mended specific modifications to the subsystem architecture to support survivability objec-
tives. Positive client response to study recommendations suggests that the method can pro-
vide significant added value for ensuring survivability of system operations. As a result of
this case study, the SNA method, artifacts, and lessons learned will be available to apply ar-
chitectural analysis for survivability to proposed and legacy DoD distributed systems.
viii CMU/SEI-98-TR-014
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1 Network System Survivability
1.1 Survivability Concepts
As part of its Survivable Systems Initiative, the CERT® Coordination Center (CERT/CC) of
the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University is developing tech-
nologies and methods for analyzing and designing survivable network systems [Ellison 97,
Linger 98, Lipson 97]. Survivability is defined as the capability of a system to fulfill its mis-
sion, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. Unlike traditional
security measures that require central control and administration, survivability addresses
highly distributed, unbounded network environments with no central control or unified secu-
rity policy. Survivability focuses on delivery of essential services and preservation of essen-
tial assets, even when systems are penetrated and compromised. As an emerging discipline,
survivability builds on existing disciplines, including security [Summers 97], fault tolerance
[Mendiratta 92], and reliability [Musa 87], and introduces new concepts and principles.
The focus of survivability is on delivery of essential services and preservation of essential
assets during attack and compromise, and timely recovery of full services and assets follow-
ing attack. Essential services and assets are defined as those system capabilities that are criti-
cal to fulfilling mission objectives. Survivability depends on three key system capabilities:
resistance, recognition, and recovery. Resistance is the capability of a system to repel attacks.
Recognition is the capability to detect attacks as they occur, and to evaluate the extent of
damage and compromise. Recovery, a hallmark of survivability, is the capability to maintain
essential services and assets during attack, limit the extent of damage, and restore full serv-
ices following attack.
                                               
® CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
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STEP 1:
System Definition:
· Mission requirements definition
· Architecture definition and elicitation
STEP 2:
Essential Capability Definition:
· Essential service/asset selection/scenarios
· Essential component identification
STEP 3:
Compromisable Capability Definition:
· Intrusion scenario selection
· Compromisable component identification
STEP 4:
Survivability Analysis:
· Softspot component (essential and
compromisable) identification
· Resistance, recognition, and recovery analysis
· Survivability Map development
Figure 1:    The Survivable Network Analysis Method
1.2 The Survivable Network Analysis Method
The Survivable Network Analysis (SNA) method for assessing and improving the survivabil-
ity of network architectures is depicted in Figure 1. The method builds on the Information
Security Evaluation method1 by permitting the evaluation of a distributed architecture rather
than focusing on the site-level security.  The method can be applied to an existing or pro-
posed system by a small team of trained evaluators through a structured interaction with sys-
tem personnel composed of several meetings and working sessions.
The method is composed of four principal steps, as follows. In step 1, mission objectives and
requirements for a current or candidate system are reviewed, and the structure and properties
of its architecture are elicited. In step 2, essential services (services that must be maintained
during attack) and essential assets (assets whose integrity, confidentiality, availability, and
other properties must be maintained during attack) are identified, based on mission objectives
and consequences of failure. Essential service and asset uses are characterized by usage sce-
narios. These scenarios are mapped onto the architecture as execution traces to identify cor-
responding essential components (components that must be available to deliver essential
services and maintain essential assets). In step 3, intrusion scenarios are selected based on
the system environment and assessment of risks and intruder capabilities. These scenarios are
likewise mapped onto the architecture as execution traces to identify corresponding com-
promisable components (components that could be penetrated and damaged by intrusion). In
step 4, softspot components of the architecture are identified as components that are both es-
                                               
1 Fraser, B.; Konda, S.; Lipson, H.; Longstaff, T.; & Alberts, C. Information Security Evaluation: Site
Coordinator’s Guide Pittsburgh, Pa.: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, June 1998.
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sential and compromisable, based on the results of steps 2 and 3. The softspot components
and the supporting architecture are then analyzed for the three key survivability properties of
resistance, recognition, and recovery. The analysis of the “three R’s” is summarized in a Sur-
vivability Map, as shown in Figure 2.  The map is a two-dimensional matrix that enumerates,
for every intrusion scenario and corresponding softspot effects, the current and recommended
architecture strategies for resistance, recognition, and recovery. The Survivability Map pro-
vides feedback to the original architecture and system requirements, and may result in an it-
erative process of survivability evaluation and improvement.
Intrusion
Scenario
Resistance
Strategy
Recognition Strategy Recovery Strategy
Current: Current: Current:(Scenario 1)
…
Recommended: Recommended Recommended:
Current: Current: Current:(Scenario n)
Recommended: Recommended: Recommended:
Figure 2.    Survivability Map Template
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2 Sentinel: The Case Study Subsystem
Management of mental health treatment is often performed as a manual process based on
hand-written forms and informal communication. Substantial time and effort are consumed in
coordination of various treatment providers, including physicians, social service agencies,
and healthcare facilities. CarnegieWorks, Inc. (CWI) is developing a large-scale, comprehen-
sive management system to automate, systematize, and integrate multiple aspects of regional
mental health care. The CWI system, named Vigilant, will ultimately be composed of some
22 subsystems operating on a distributed network of client and server computers, and will
maintain a large and complex database of patient and provider records. A vital part of the
Vigilant system is development and management of treatment plans. A treatment plan is de-
veloped for a patient by a provider. The problems of each patient are identified, together with
a set of goals and actions, including medication and therapy, to achieve those goals. Each
treatment plan is carried out by an interdisciplinary and interorganizational action team com-
posed of providers. An affiliation is an organization that provides healthcare services, possi-
bly to many patients. Treatment plan development and management and action team defini-
tion and coordination are key functions of the Sentinel subsystem. As a subsystem of
Vigilant, Sentinel interacts with providers, affiliations, and other subsystems. It maintains the
action teams and treatment plans as part of the Vigilant patient database, and applies regula-
tory and business rules for treatment plan development and validation. Because of the critical
nature of mental health treatment, the need to conform to regulatory requirements, and the
severe consequences of system failure, survivability of key Sentinel capabilities has been
identified by CWI personnel as extremely important.
6 CMU/SEI-98-TR-014
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3 Applying the Survivable Network
Analysis Method to Sentinel
3.1 Method Application
The SNA method was applied to the Sentinel subsystem through a structured series of meet-
ings between the analysis team and project personnel (customer and development team), in-
terleaved with analysis team working sessions, as shown in Figure 3.
Meeting 3 (with customer/development team):
Introduction of survivability findings by analysis
team, including Survivability Map and architecture
and requirements modifications.
Discussion of impacts and consequences.
Exit criteria: Results reported and customer
response obtained
Meeting 2 (with customer/development team):
Briefings by customer on system evolution plans
and ultimate operating environment.
Introduction of essential services by analysis team.
Discussion and validation of essential services by
customer and development team.
Introduction of intrusion scenarios by analysis team
Discussion and validation of intrusion scenarios by
customer and development team.
Exit criteria: Set of essential services, set of
intrusion scenarios, customer perspective on
essential services and intrusions.
Briefing on method by analysis team to developers
Meeting 1 (with development team):
Briefings by developers on mission requirements,
normal usage scenarios, survivability capabilities.
Operating environment discussion on user roles
and physical environment.
Architecture questions by analysis team.
Essential service questions by analysis team.
Exit criteria: Mission and architecture definition, set
of normal usage scenarios.
Joint Meetings Analysis Team Working Sessions
Planning session to define scope of work, meeting
schedules, and technical approach.
Discussion of architecture, essential services,
vulnerabilities, and intrusion scenarios
Development of survivability mitigation strategies,
architecture and requirements modifications, and
impacts.
Figure 3.    Meetings and Working Sessions in SNA Method Application
The objective of the first meeting was to obtain as much information as possible about the
subsystem and its mission and architecture. The development team briefed this material and
provided supporting documents. The second meeting included the customer as well as the
development team, and was used to understand the ultimate operating environment of the
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subsystem and future plans for the entire system. At this meeting, the analysis team validated
the selection of essential services and assets for Sentinel, as well as the definition of system
user types and characteristics. The analysis team also introduced and validated the set of in-
trusion scenarios to be applied to Sentinel. At the final meeting the analysis team presented
its findings on Sentinel survivability. Proposed mitigation strategies in terms of resistance,
recognition, and recovery were presented, and possible architectural modifications and re-
quirements impacts were discussed. Customer reaction to the recommendations was positive.
Between these meetings, the analysis team met in working sessions to assess the subsystem
and its vulnerabilities, and to develop survivability recommendations. These meetings and
working sessions carried out the SNA steps as described below.
Step 1: System Definition
Mission Requirements Definition
The following normal usage scenarios (NUS) elicited from Sentinel requirements documen-
tation characterize principal mission objectives of the subsystem. Each scenario includes a
statement of the primary Sentinel responsibility with respect to the scenario:
· NUS1: Enter a new treatment plan. A provider assigned to a patient admitted into an
affiliation performs an initial assessment and defines a treatment plan, specifying
problems, goals, and actions. Sentinel must apply business rules to treatment plan
definition and validation.
· NUS2: Update a treatment plan.  A provider reviews a treatment plan, possibly adding or
changing problems, goals, or actions, and possibly updating the status of these items.
Sentinel must apply business rules to treatment plan update and validation.
· NUS3: View a treatment plan. A provider treating a patient views a treatment plan to
learn the status of problems, goals, and actions. Sentinel must ensure that the plan
displayed is current and valid.
· NUS4: Create or modify an action team. A provider defines or changes the membership
of a treatment team in an affiliation for a patient. Sentinel must ensure that the treatment
team definition is current and correct.
· NUS5: Report the current treatment plans in an affiliation. An administrator views the
current state of her affiliation’s treatment of a patient or set of patients. Sentinel must
ensure that the treatment plan summaries are current and correct.
· NUS6: Change patient medication. A provider changes the medication protocol in a
treatment plan for a patient, possibly in response to unforeseen complications or side
effects. Sentinel must ensure that the treatment plan is current and valid.
Architecture Definition and Elicitation
The original Sentinel architecture obtained from design documentation is depicted in simpli-
fied form in Figure 4. Execution traces of the normal usage scenarios identified in step 1 were
used by the evaluation team to illuminate and understand architectural properties. The traces
revealed component sequencing within the architecture, as well as reference and update of
database artifacts.
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List
Manager
Reporting
Engine
Treatment
Plan Builder
Treatment
Plan Validator
Action
Team Builder
User Interface
Sentinel
Application
Sentinel
Back End
Business Logic
Common Database
API
Other
System 
Components
Other
System 
Components
Figure 4.    Original Sentinel Architecture
Architecture component functions are summarized as follows:
· User Interface: resides outside of Sentinel to allow a single User Interface to serve
multiple subsystems and components.
· API: provides synchronous RPC and asynchronous messaging facilities for use by the
User Interface and other system components.
· List Manager: maintains lists including patients, affiliations, providers, action teams, and
relations among them.
· Reporting Engine: provides read-only viewing and reporting of Sentinel artifacts,
including current treatment plans and their histories.
· Treatment Plan Builder: creates treatment plans for patients, including problems, goals,
and actions.
· Treatment Plan Validator: checks the completeness and consistency of treatment plan
development and modification.
· Action Team Builder: provides capability to define and modify action team membership.
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· Business Logic: contains enterprise-defined business rules, including validation checks
for treatment plan development and logging triggers that manage change control of
sensitive data.
· Database: sentinel shares access to a common database with other subsystems and
components.
Step 2: Essential Capability Definition
Essential Service/Asset Selection/Scenarios
Essential services and assets represent critical system capabilities that must survive and be
available during intrusions. Criticality is based on analysis of mission objectives, risks and
consequences of failure, and availability of alternatives. Such an analysis may result in selec-
tion of any number of essential services and assets, and may stratify them into survivability
classes of varying criticality. The survivability analysis of the Sentinel subsystem was carried
out together with CWI personnel, and was based on the normal usage scenarios identified in
step 1. The analysis resulted in selection of a single essential service, namely, NUS3, the ca-
pability to view treatment plans. This service, more than any other, was deemed essential to
delivery of mental health treatment because providers depend on real-time, on-demand access
to treatment plans in clinical situations, particularly in cases of medication or therapeutic
problems of an emergency or life-critical nature. The other normal usage scenarios could be
postponed for hours or even days in the event of system intrusion and compromise. The
analysis also identified a single essential asset, namely, the treatment plans themselves. Pres-
ervation of treatment plan integrity and confidentiality was deemed essential to meeting Sen-
tinel mission objectives. The other Sentinel artifacts, such as action teams, affiliations, and
providers, could all be reconstructed or updated hours or days after intrusion with no irre-
versible consequences.
Essential Component Identification
Essential system components are those components that participate in delivery of essential
services and preservation of essential assets. The execution trace of the NUS3 scenario re-
vealed the reporting engine and the database components, as well as their supporting compo-
nents and artifacts, are essential to maintaining the capability to perform the scenario. As es-
sential assets, the integrity and confidentiality of treatment plans depends on database
components for security and validation.
Step 3: Compromisable Capability Definition
Intrusion Scenario Selection
Based on the system environment and assessment of intruder objectives and capabilities, the
following five intrusion usage scenarios (IUS) were selected as representative of the types of
attacks to which Sentinel could be subjected. Each scenario is preceded by an IUS number
and type of attack (shown in parentheses), and followed by a brief explanation:
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· IUS1 (Data Integrity and Spoofing Attack): An intruder swaps the patient identification
of two validated treatment plans.
Sentinel performs validation of treatment plans before entering them into the database. In
this scenario, an intruder accesses the database server to corrupt treatment plans without
using the Sentinel client, but rather by spoofing a legitimate client.
· IUS2 (Data Integrity and Insider Attack): An insider uses other legitimate database clients
to modify or view treatment plans controlled by Sentinel.
The database security assumes that clients have exclusive write access to specific
database tables. While the IUS1 scenario attempts to access the database directly, this
scenario examines inappropriate access through other database clients.
· IUS3 (Spoofing Attack): An unauthorized user employs Sentinel to modify or view
treatment plans by spoofing a legitimate user.
Some terminal access points for Sentinel are located in public areas, and hence are not as
physically secure as those in private offices. This scenario illustrates opportunistic use of
an unoccupied but logged-in terminal by an illegitimate user who spoofs the legitimate
logged-in user.
· IUS4 (Data Integrity and Recovery Attack): An intruder corrupts major portions of the
database, leading to loss of trust in validated treatment plans.
Scenarios IUS1 and IUS2 assume a sophisticated attacker who targets and recognizes
specific treatment plans, and modifies only a few fields. This scenario assumes a brute-
force corruption of the database, leading to large-scale loss of trust and potential denial of
service during massive recovery operations.
· IUS5 (Insider and Availability Attack): An intruder destroys or limits access to the
Sentinel software so it cannot be used to retrieve treatment plans.
This scenario could be as simple as removing the Sentinel software, or could involve
attacks on the network or application ports to limit application access.
Compromisable Component Identification
Compromisable system components are those components that can be accessed and poten-
tially damaged by intrusion scenarios. The execution traces of the five IUS scenarios revealed
the following component vulnerabilities:
· IUS1: This scenario compromises the treatment plan component. There were no validity
checks made on treatment plans after the initial entry.
· IUS2: This scenario compromises the treatment plan component. The treatment plan
changes might be consistent but made by an improper agent.
· IUS3: This scenario compromises the treatment plan component. The majority of system
users would object to logging into the system repeatedly as a way to continually monitor
the validity of the user.  The system had not considered those terminals which were in
open areas easily accessible by unauthorized users.
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· IUS4: This scenario compromises the treatment plan component. Database recovery
required higher priority with respect to operations.
· IUS5: All software components of the Sentinel subsystem are affected by this scenario.
While there were implicit user requirements on availability, it had not been considered in
the architecture.
Step 4: Survivability Analysis
Softspot Component Identification
As noted earlier, softspot components are those components that are both essential and com-
promisable. The foregoing analysis shows that the (essential service) reporting engine com-
ponent and the (essential asset) database treatment plan component can both be compromised
in a variety of ways. The survivability analysis focuses on the essential services and assets
that these components provide in fulfilling the mission objectives of the system.
Resistance, Recognition, and Recovery Analysis
Analysis of the three R’s resulted in the Survivability Map depicted in Table 1(ID stands for
identification, TP for treatment plan, UI for user interface, and DB for database). The rec-
ommendations in Table 1 are annotated with reference numbers {1} to {6} that correlate with
changes to the architecture defined in Figure 5. Development of the table began by matching
each intrusion scenario trace (created in step 3 above) to the softspot components. Each trace
was first checked for all current resistance (protection) components in the architecture that
would increase the difficulty experienced by an intruder in reaching the softspots referenced
in the trace. Because no detailed implementation information was available to identify spe-
cific vulnerabilities in these resistance components, an assumption was made that any vulner-
abilities in them would be found and corrected over time. The greater the resources available
to an intruder, however, the less time a resistance component will be completely effective.
The current resistance components are described in the resistance column of the Survivability
Map for each scenario.
For the recognition column, a process similar to the resistance analysis was followed. To as-
sess the effectiveness of current recognition components, a number of assumptions were
made and listed in the Survivability Map. For example, in scenario IUS3 in Table 1, there is a
documented assumption that a provider will become suspicious when there are a large num-
ber of denied accesses to treatment plans reported to some party. If this assumption is not
valid, then there are no current recognition strategies associated with this scenario.
For the recovery column, assumptions were made regarding common database management
facilities (standard backup and recovery of the database itself and version control of the Sen-
tinel software). Table entries for current recovery strategies included these assumptions, so
that if in fact they are not satisfied in the final system, the recovery strategy will be less ef-
fective than that described in the Survivability Map. However, the assumptions for the cur-
rent recovery strategies take into account standard practice with regard to distributed database
systems.
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Once all of the current resistance, recognition, and recovery strategies were identified, gaps
and weaknesses were analyzed for common points in the architecture where a particular sur-
vivability improvement could address multiple scenarios or multiple strategies. These high-
leverage recommendations are listed in a consistent form and identified as a common rec-
ommendation. Other gaps identified by a lack of an existing strategy in any of the resistance,
recognition, or recovery columns were also addressed. For the resistance column, recommen-
dations were made even where an existing resistance mechanism existed, as this mechanism
can be expected to degrade over time. Ultimately, it is up to the system architect to determine
the cost-benefit of implementing these recommendations. The Survivability Map can help an
architect determine the impact of accepting risks associated with weaknesses in the resis-
tance, recognition, or recovery columns, as these are correlated to the intrusion scenarios that
affect the essential services or assets of the system. In Table 1, a number of gaps and as-
sumptions are identified in the current resistance, recognition, and recovery strategies. Of
particular interest to an architect are those recommendations that deal with multiple intrusion
scenarios. For example, adding a crypto-checksum to the validation of a treatment plan ad-
dresses several scenarios.
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Intrusion Scenario Resistance Strategy Recognition Strategy Recovery Strategy
Current:
Two passwords are re-
quired for TP access.
Current:
Logging of changes made to
DB.
Provider may recognize an
incorrect TP.
Current:
Built-in recovery in commer-
cial DB.
Backup and recovery scheme
defined.
IUS1:
Intruder swaps the ID of
two validated TPs.
Recommended:
Implement strong authen-
tication supported in a
security API layer. {1}
Recommended:
Add crypto-checksum when
TP is validated.{3} Verify
crypto-checksum when TP is
retrieved. {4}
Recommended:
Implement a recovery mode in
the user interface to support
searching for and recovering
incorrect TPs. {1}
Current:
Security model for DB
field access.
Current:
None.
Current:
Scrap data and start over, or
find an early backup and ver-
ify each entry.
IUS2:
Outside agents exercise
(legitimate) access to
DB fields controlled by
Sentinel.
Recommended:
Need to verify the security
model in light of module
addition and integration.
Recommended:
Perform a validation on access
of a TP for verification. {2}
Add crypto-checksum when
TP is validated.{3} Verify this
checksum when TP is re-
trieved. {4}
Recommended:
Scan DB for invalid crypto-
checksums and/or invalid TPs
and recover to last known
correct TP. {4}
Current:
None. No timeout is speci-
fied so that anyone can
use a logged in but va-
cated terminal. However,
intruder only has access to
logged in user’s TPs
Current:
None, except for unusual
number of denied accesses to
TPs as an intruder attempts to
locate particular TPs.
Current:
Can get list of modified TPs
through the spoofed users
transaction history. Manually
recover each modified record.
IUS3:
An unauthorized user
employs Sentinel to
modify or view TPs by
spoofing a legitimate
user.
Recommended:
Add a short logout timeout
for any terminals in un-
controlled areas (not phy-
sician’s offices). {1}
Recommended:
Add logging, access control,
and illegal access thresholds
to the security API. {1}
Recommended:
Develop a recovery procedure
and support it in the UI. {1}
Current:
Security model in the DB
protects data against cor-
ruption.
Current:
None, except when provider
happens to recognize a cor-
rupted TP.
Current:
Locate an uncorrupted backup
or reconstruct TPs from
scratch.
IUS4:
Intruder corrupts DB
leading to loss of trust
in validated TPs. Recommended:
Implement live replicated
DB systems that cross
check for validity (sup-
ported in many commer-
cial DB systems). {5}
Recommended:
Add and check crypto-
checksums on records in the
DB. {3} {4}
Recommended:
Reduce the backup cycle to
quickly rebuild once a cor-
rupted DB is detected. {5}
Current:
Keep originals available.
Current:
System doesn’t work.
Current:
Reload the system from origi-
nals.
IUS5:
Intruder destroys the
Sentinel software so it
cannot be used to re-
trieve TPs
Recommended:
Keep a spare CD available
for quick recovery
Recommended:
None. Easy to detect this one.
Recommended:
Fast recovery from CD.
Create a small sub-system that
can retrieve TPs while Senti-
nel is down or being up-
graded. {6}
Table 1.    Sentinel Subsystem Survivability Map
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The modified architecture resulting from the Survivability Map analysis is depicted in Figure
5, with additions and changes shown with dashed lines and shading. Many of the recommen-
dations in the Survivability Map affect the same architectural component. To further illustrate
the overlaps, reference number annotations {1} to {6} attached to the recommendations are
included in the modified architecture. In this way, it was easy to determine which of the rec-
ommendations addressed multiple intrusion scenarios. With limited resources to mitigate
these risks, this view of the recommendations can help the architect allocate resources to
high-impact modifications of the architecture. As the modified architecture was formed to
address the recommendations in the Survivability Map, several natural locations emerged in
the existing architecture where implementation of the recommendations could be localized
with minimal impact to the overall system. This was primarily due to the functional decom-
position used in the original architecture. It is also likely that the evaluation of the scenarios
led to the formation of recommendations that were natural to the architecture, since in exe-
cuting the scenarios over the architecture, the impact on individual modules was evident.
List
Manager
Reporting
Engine {2}
TP   Builder -
crypto-chk  
{3}
TP Validator -
crypto-chk  
{4}
Action
Team Builder
User Interface
Sentinel
Application
Sentinel
Back End
Business Logic
Security {1}
Common Database - Replicated and Daily Backups {5}
API
Other
System 
Components
Other
System 
Components
Minimal
User
Interface
Minimal
Reporting 
Engine/TPs
Isolated
Reporting
System {6}
Security Layer  {1}
Figure 5.    Sentinel Architecture with Survivability Modifications
To support the essential service (treatment plan display) and asset (treatment plans) identified
in the earlier stages of the process, a simple new component {6} was added outside the origi-
nal architecture that could serve the purpose of retrieving treatment plans if the primary sys-
tem should fail for any reason. With this external component, intrusion scenario IUS5 was
addressed. This new component had minimal impact on the original architecture, since it
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identified a distinctly separate software program used to interface with the underlying data-
base. It is possible, depending on the selection of the database system, that this small compo-
nent could be included in the procurement of the software as a simple database retrieval pro-
gram. In addition, to address the validation of treatment plans read from the database (not
simply saved to the database), there was a sequencing recommendation ({2}, {3}, and {4})
that all data retrieved from the database would pass through the validation module to verify
the correctness of the crypto-checksum.
A proactive validation function was also recommended, whereby the validation module
would retrieve treatment plans from the database during idle time to continuously validate the
data saved in the database against the saved crypto-checksums.
To address IUS3, it was desirable to add a security layer {1} to the architecture between the
user interface and the other parts of the Sentinel architecture. This provided a location for
monitoring and logging activity between the user interface and the Sentinel subsystem. This
is especially important if the recommendations on the user interface (documented in IUS1,
IUS3, and IUS4) were not implemented (these were out of scope for the Sentinel develop-
ment team). The security layer provides functionality for passing user credentials to the data-
base for access control in addition to providing intrusion detection, timeout information, and
other security-relevant functions.
Several of the recommendations did not address the view of the architecture presented in
Figure 5 directly, but were concerned with the use of the architecture. For example, the rec-
ommendation in IUS2 calling for the validation of the security model in the Sentinel back
end system {5}. This is an example of an architectural requirement that is expressed in the
Survivability Map, but is difficult to capture in the common “topology” view of the architec-
ture. These recommendations are mapped to specific components in the topology view; how-
ever, the changes to these components are not evident in their implementation, but rather in
the process of their implementation.
In addition to architectural analysis, these survivability findings can also be reflected in
modifications to Sentinel requirements. The Mission Requirements Definition of step 1 re-
vealed few specific survivability or security requirements for the Sentinel subsystem, other
than requiring 1) validation of treatment plan data, 2) utilization of some security features
built into the standard login process and the database, and 3) a development strategy that
would permit easy modification to add security features. Changes are needed at the highest
level to two areas of the requirements. Under survivability conditions, there is a critical need
for providers to view treatment plans within a reasonable time.
CMU/SEI-98-TR-014 17
In addition, there is a need to protect the integrity of the treatment plans in the database.
These high-level requirements might be stated as follows:
· The treatment plan data shall be viewable within xx seconds of request under nominal
conditions. The treatment plan data shall be viewable within yy seconds (minutes) of
request during recovery.
· Resistance and recognition techniques shall be used to protect the integrity of the
treatment plan data under intrusion scenarios IUS1 through IUS5.
These requirements can be refined to encompass software, procedural, and hardware re-
quirements. The software requirements might be:
· An emergency reporting system shall allow treatment plans to be viewed during recovery.
· Treatment plans shall be validated when they are read and written. If a treatment plan is
invalid, the last valid version of the treatment plan shall be recovered.
· Encrypted checksums shall be used to protect the integrity of the treatment plans.
· The selected database software shall support replication.
The procedural requirements might be:
· The Sentinel software shall be backed up on CD.
· Daily backups of the database shall be performed.
The hardware/operating system requirement might be:
· Workstations located in public areas shall have a short timeout based on inactivity. There
shall be login access thresholds for incorrect logins.
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4 Lessons Learned
The SNA method is under continuing development and additional case studies are planned.
Lessons learned at this stage focus on the validity of the initial assumptions and objectives of
the method, as well as refinements that can be explored in future case studies. The Sentinel
case study began with three assumptions:
· Survivability strategies could be organized in terms of resistance, recognition, and
recovery.
· The analysis should focus on early phases of the life cycle, specifically, on the mission
requirements, as they represent the essential services and assets of the system, and on the
architecture, as it represents the components that must be survivable and the strategies for
achieving survivability.
· The application logic rather than the system infrastructure should bear a significant
portion of the responsibility for implementation of survivability strategies [Saltzer 84].
The case study supported these assumptions. Organization of survivability strategies in terms
of resistance, recognition, and recovery was straightforward and easily communicated to the
customer. Identification of essential services and assets was a critical step in limiting the
scope of the analysis, as well as in reducing the number and scope of architectural revisions
which the customer should consider. The Sentinel subsystem examined in this study was just
entering its implementation phase; future studies should include a need to reengineer existing
systems.
The success of the SNA method depends on the effectiveness of the recommendations, that
is, achievement of a modified system that is by some set of measures more survivable. Of
equal importance is whether the customer can incorporate the recommendations into the ex-
isting software development process, and thus be able to adopt the suggested changes. Be-
cause the survivability recommendations for Sentinel concentrated on refining an existing
architecture rather than requiring a redesign, they did satisfy this criterion.
While most of the recommendations focused on revisions to the application architecture, sev-
eral suggested changes in design and implementation or in operations and procedures to sup-
port survivability in the existing architecture. The study did raise some issues of extensibility,
that is, could the proposed architecture support the functionality desired in later versions from
a survivability perspective. Analysis of extensibility could be an important aspect of future
studies. The recommendations produced in this study were able to take advantage of existing
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system features to support reliability and fault tolerance, such as the transactional support and
recovery mechanisms provided by the relational database.
While the study did not involve extensive distributed system requirements, it was neverthe-
less fruitful to look for the design assumptions that might fail in a networked environment or
make recovery difficult. For example, a networked application might exhibit requirements for
supporting disconnected operations by clients, and thus exhibit an architecture that supports a
messaging communications model. A future study might explore how to leverage that type of
architectural choice to support general survivability in the same way that this study leveraged
survivability capabilities of the relational database infrastructure. In addition, the SNA
method, artifacts, and lessons learned described in this case study report can be leveraged for
survivability analysis of a variety of proposed and legacy DoD systems in diverse domains.
These domains include distributed and networked command and control, integrated logistics,
mission-specific, and real-time systems.
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